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War Powers Litigation After 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton 
Michael D. Ramsey* 
INTRODUCTION 
In modern times, judicial opinions have been largely absent 
from the debate over constitutional war powers. Among other 
things, it is widely assumed—especially in light of the courts’ 
avoidance of the issue during the Vietnam War—that the 
political question doctrine would preclude judicial determination 
of war-initiation powers. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,1 however, the 
Supreme Court appeared to re-characterize and limit the political 
question doctrine in a way that might allow wider litigation of 
war powers issues. According to Zivotofsky, the doctrine does not 
preclude courts from determining the meaning of statutes and 
the Constitution in separation of powers disputes, even when 
substantial foreign affairs issues are at stake.2 
The actual subject of the Zivotofsky litigation was, however, 
relatively modest as foreign affairs controversies go. The courts’ 
willingness to retreat from the political question doctrine will be 
more severely tested in matters of greater foreign affairs 
significance, such as war powers. This essay considers the 
implications of Zivotofsky for war powers litigation, including by 
revisiting the Vietnam-era decisions. It first asks whether 
Zivotofsky, if taken at face value, does indeed suggest a renewed 
viability of war powers litigation. Second, it asks whether, as a 
practical matter, courts can comfortably undertake the task of 
war powers adjudication. Third, it considers the value of more 
aggressive war powers adjudication, including whether a 
Zivotofsky-inspired approach to war powers disputes is consistent 
with the courts’ constitutional role. 
 
 * Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Faculty Director of 
International and Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School. 
Thanks to Curtis Bradley, Tom Campbell, Michael Glennon, Martin Lederman, 
Saikrishna Prakash, Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, Stephen Vladeck, Ingrid 
Wuerth, and participants in the Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable for 
helpful comments. 
 1 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
 2 Id. at 194–96. 
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I. ZIVOTOFSKY AS DOCTRINAL CHANGE 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton appears to signal a major shift in 
thinking about justiciability in separation of powers disputes.3 
Briefly, the case concerned a statute allowing U.S. citizens born 
in Jerusalem to request passports reflecting birth in “Jerusalem, 
Israel.”4 The U.S. executive branch refused to apply the statute, 
invoking the president’s supposedly exclusive control of foreign 
affairs and the diplomatically sensitive nature of Jerusalem’s 
political status. In a suit to enforce the statute, brought by the 
parents of Zivotofsky, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, the D.C. 
Circuit found the case to be a non-justiciable political question.5 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for six Justices reversed, 
emphasizing the central role of the judiciary in determining the 
meaning of the Constitution.6 Roberts’ opinion acknowledged 
that a political question might exist (a) if the Constitution’s text 
committed the decision to another branch or (b) if there were no 
judicially manageable standards by which to decide. But it found 
neither circumstance to exist in the passport dispute; to the 
contrary, the opinion emphasized that the case involved 
determining the constitutionality of a statute, which is “what 
courts do.”7 
Prior to Zivotofsky, political question analysis had been 
dominated by Justice Brennan’s six-factor test in Baker v. Carr.8 
Baker had been cited repeatedly by lower courts in political 
question cases9 (including the lower courts in Zivotofsky), and by 
then-Justice Rehnquist’s influential concurring opinion in 
Goldwater v. Carter, an opinion that seemed strongly to disfavor 
justiciability in separation of powers cases.10 But Zivotofsky 
 
 3 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925–26 (2015) (describing Zivotofsky as having “far-
reaching significance” for justiciability of foreign relations law cases). 
 4 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228, 
§ 213(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366, § 214(d) (2002). 
 5 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(principally concluding that decisions regarding recognition are textually committed to 
the executive branch); see also id. at 1240, 1244–45 (Judge Edwards, concurring) (finding 
on the merits that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered with the president’s 
executive power). 
 6 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and 
Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and in 
the result, and Justice Alito concurred in the result. Justice Breyer was the sole dissenter. 
 7 Id. at 201. 
 8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 9 See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544, 549–58 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(sequentially applying each of Baker’s six factors). 
 10 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by 
Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Stevens, J., concurring). 
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barely mentioned Baker, citing it only in passing.11 More 
importantly, Zivotofsky—although rejecting a political question 
challenge—mentioned only two of Baker’s six factors (the ones 
noted above); it did not at any point describe the political 
question doctrine as resting on a six-factor test or acknowledge 
that Baker had suggested a six-factor test.12 And even more 
notably, the Baker factors Zivotofsky failed to mention were the 
most open-ended, the most easily invoked to defeat justiciability, 
and the most apparently relevant to Zivotofsky itself 
in particular: “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made”; or “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”13 
Also of note, the Zivotofsky majority opinion did not discuss 
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Goldwater—and Rehnquist’s 
analysis in Goldwater seems inconsistent with it. Goldwater 
involved the question whether the president had to obtain the 
Senate’s approval before terminating a treaty in accordance with 
the treaty’s terms.14 Although it involved the constitutionality of 
an executive action rather than the constitutionality of a statute, 
in other respects the dispute in Goldwater fit with Roberts’ 
description of a question of constitutional law directed to the 
courts. As in Zivotofsky, Goldwater did not question the merits of 
the president’s policy; the question was not what decision 
should be made, but which branch, constitutionally, should make 
the decision. 
In sum, Zivotofsky appears to reaffirm and extend the 
view that foreign affairs controversies involving only the 
interpretation of statutes or the Constitution are not 
qualitatively different from ordinary statutory and constitutional 
questions. In disregarding Goldwater and much of Baker, it 
appears substantially to narrow the grounds upon which a 
 
 11 See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, 201 (citing Baker directly only once, and 
indirectly only as quoted—incompletely—in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
228 (1993)). 
 12 Compare Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, with id. at 202 (Sotomayor J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“In Baker, this Court identified six circumstances in which 
an issue might present a political question . . . .”). 
 13 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 14 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. There was no opinion of the Court in Goldwater, 
so Zivotofsky was under no obligation to cite it—but the Zivotofsky majority’s decision not 
to discuss Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which attracted four votes and had been seen 
as an important statement of the political question doctrine, seems significant. 
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political question can be found, and thus to open more separation 
of powers controversies to judicial resolution. 
The question remains, however, whether Zivotofsky is an 
isolated decision or a meaningful shift. Zivotofsky involved a 
relatively minor—even obscure—dispute about the wording of 
the passports of (one assumes) a very small number of people. 
Little evidence existed of major foreign policy disruption.15 
Zivotofsky’s viability when the Court confronts more momentous 
matters seems open to doubt. 
To think about that question, consider the justiciability of 
war powers disputes. Under the Baker formulation—especially as 
applied in Goldwater—conventional wisdom has been that 
questions of the president’s unilateral ability to use military force 
are likely non-justiciable. But Zivotofsky calls that assumption 
into doubt, first by suggesting that constitutional disputes in 
foreign affairs are matters granted to the judiciary for resolution, 
and second by apparently dispensing with Baker’s concern for 
“respect due coordinate branches” and “embarrassment” arising 
from “multifarious pronouncements” on foreign affairs.16 
Zivotofsky’s viability, however, may itself depend on the ability to 
construct a framework of justiciability for war powers disputes 
that is manageable and plausible. 
II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND VIETNAM-ERA WAR POWERS 
LITIGATION 
To make more concrete the questions posed above, this 
section considers the most extensive modern litigation of 
constitutional war powers. During the Vietnam War era, from 
1967 through 1974, lower courts heard multiple challenges to the 
war’s constitutionality. None of these challenges was successful 
in limiting the war, and none reached the Supreme Court apart 
from a single unexplained affirmance of a three-judge district 
court.17 Nonetheless, these cases provide a concrete historical 
example of war powers litigation. 
To begin, there is something of a myth that the Vietnam-era 
cases declared all war powers questions to be political questions. 
Some cases did, but others found some war powers issues to be 
political questions and others not to be. The diversity of 
questions and answers in the Vietnam-era thus offers a way to 
 
 15 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191–94. 
 16 Baker, 369 U.S. at 216–17, 225. These were the principal Baker factors not 
discussed in Zivotofsky. 
 17 Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). 
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start thinking about what a post-Zivotofsky war powers 
justiciability analysis might involve. 
Courts in the Vietnam era pursued at least three different 
approaches. Two major cases found war powers litigation broadly 
to be political questions. The D.C. Circuit, in one of the early 
cases, reached this conclusion almost without analysis, resting 
principally on the proposition that foreign affairs matters were 
for the president to determine.18 Somewhat later, a three-judge 
district court in Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion after 
much more extended analysis; the Supreme Court affirmed this 
decision without opinion.19 
The Second Circuit pursued an intermediate course in a 
series of cases. It found the basic question whether congressional 
authorization was needed for war initiation to be justiciable; on 
the merits, it found that congressional authorization was 
constitutionally required and had been given.20 However, 
ostensibly on political question grounds, it held that the method 
of authorization was up to Congress (thus rejecting, for example, 
the proposition that an actual formal declaration was required 
and accepting congressional authorization via the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution and appropriations in support of the military effort).21 
In further litigation, the Second Circuit invoked the political 
question doctrine to avoid deciding two specific challenges. First, 
plaintiffs contended that the president’s decision to bomb North 
Vietnam and mine North Vietnamese harbors after a ceasefire 
lacked congressional approval.22 At this point, Congress had 
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and indicated that the 
war should be wound down. Plaintiffs argued that the president’s 
actions were unapproved escalations, while the president argued 
that renewed bombing to enforce the ceasefire was the best way 
to achieve Congress’s goals.23 The court, on political question 
grounds, refused to second-guess the President’s strategic 
 
 18 Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The fundamental 
division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from 
overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these 
matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”). 
 19 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 698–707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (relying heavily on 
Baker v. Carr), aff’d without opinion sub nom., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); 
see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding the 
whole matter of war powers to be a political question, at least in the absence of an 
objection by Congress to the president’s actions). 
 20 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 21 Id. at 1043; accord DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v. 
Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 22 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1041. 
 23 Id. 
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assessment.24 In a subsequent case, plaintiffs argued that 
the President’s bombing of Cambodia—ostensibly a neutral 
country—was not authorized by Congress. The President 
similarly claimed that the bombing was the best way to wind 
down U.S. involvement, and the court (this time over a dissent by 
Judge Oakes) refused to decide on political question grounds.25 
A third group of opinions showed greater willingness to 
reach the merits. In a subsequent case in the D.C. Circuit, a 
divided panel followed the Second Circuit in finding that 
congressional authorization for the war was constitutionally 
required, and then, rejecting the Second Circuit’s analysis, 
concluded that Congress’s authorization could not be found 
merely from appropriations and other statutes passed to support 
the war effort.26 (Like most of the Second Circuit opinions, this 
case came after Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution.) As a remedy, however, the court found injunctive 
relief inappropriate because at that point, the president (at 
Congress’s direction) appeared to be ending the U.S. involvement 
in any event.27 In addition, two dissenting opinions from the 
cases mentioned above argued for reaching the merits. Judge 
Lord dissented at length from the three-judge panel’s political 
question conclusion.28 In the Second Circuit, Judge Oakes would 
have found the Cambodian bombing unauthorized (at least after 
 
 24 DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152–53 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 25 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court ruled on 
the merits that the Cambodia bombing was unconstitutional and directed that it cease. In 
a once-famous flurry of motions, the court of appeals stayed the district court order, and 
the plaintiffs asked Justice Thurgood Marshall, as circuit justice, to vacate the stay. 
When Marshall refused, plaintiffs asked Justice Douglas to lift the stay, and he did. See 
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Justice Marshall); id. at 1320 (Justice 
Douglas). On a motion from the government, Justice Marshall, with the concurrence of 
the full Court apart from Justice Douglas, overturned Justice Douglas’s order. See 
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322 (1973). Ultimately, as noted in the text, the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court on political question grounds and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. See Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). 
 26 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that “none of 
the legislation drawn to the court's attention [including appropriations and extension of 
the military draft] may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war”). As noted in the 
opinion, Judge Tamm would have found appropriations an adequate authorization. Id. at 
615. Four judges, including Judge Tamm, favored rehearing the case en banc on the 
grounds that appropriations were a proper mode of authorization. Id. at 616 (statement of 
Judge MacKinnon, joined by Judges Tamm, Robb, and Wilkey). 
 27 Id. at 616 (finding it to be a political question whether the president was 
proceeding appropriately to end the war). 
 28 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Judge Lord, dissenting) 
(“This case does not involve second guessing the wisdom of the Executive in a matter 
committed by the Constitution to that branch of the Government. It is rather a 
constitutional question concerning the division of power within our system, involving a 
determination of whether the executive branch has exceeded the scope of its 
constitutional power.”). 
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repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) because it had been secret 
and because it constituted a fundamental change in the scope of 
the war by involving an additional country in hostilities.29 
These cases suggest at least three types of questions in war 
powers litigation: (1) whether Congress’s authorization of military 
action is required; (2) if so, whether Congress has authorized it; 
and (3) the scope of Congress’s authorization. They further 
suggest, as developed in the next section, that some of these 
questions are more susceptible to judicial resolution than others. 
III. WAR POWERS LITIGATION AFTER ZIVOTOFSKY 
This section considers the extent to which Zivotofsky 
vindicates the stronger view of war powers litigation in the 
Vietnam era. I conclude that it does, with significant limitations. 
A. Standing 
At the outset, it is worth noting that narrower modern views 
of standing would change the dynamics of the Vietnam-era 
litigation. Several of the major cases depended on theories of 
standing that are likely no longer viable: citizen suits, suits 
based on remote possibilities, and suits based on the standing of 
members of Congress.30 However, the litigation also reflected at 
least one theory of standing likely still available: suit by a 
member of the military challenging deployment into combat.31 It 
is also possible that people overseas affected by the conflict might 
have standing if U.S. citizens are in the war zone32 or if the Court 
recognizes the ability of non-citizens abroad to sue to enforce 
constitutional provisions.33 Further, it remains an open question 
whether Congress as a whole or one of its Houses (as opposed to 
individual members) can bring suit to protect congressional 
powers.34 Thus, modern standing law is likely to limit, but not 
foreclose, the possibility of war powers litigation. 
 
 29 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge 
Oakes, dissenting). 
 30 See, e.g., id. at 1307, 1315 (congressional standing); Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 613–14 
(congressional standing); Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 691 (taxpayer standing). 
 31 See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 32 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515–21 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(finding U.S. citizen had standing to challenge U.S. military actions on his land in 
Honduras), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 
471 U.S. 1113 (1985). 
 33 A possibility suggested by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008). 
 34 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–77 (D.D.C. 
2015) (generally finding the question of the standing of the House of Representatives to be 
unresolved by prior cases, and concluding in the particular case that the House as an 
institution had standing to challenge some actions of the president); see also Ariz. State 
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B. Questions Involving Congressional Approval 
Whether Congress must authorize a military action has two 
components: (1) whether the declare war clause gives Congress 
exclusive authority over initiating war; and (2) if so, whether the 
conflict at issue is a “war” that requires Congress’s authorization. 
In Zivotofsky’s terms, the first question seems clearly one for the 
courts. It is a question of the Constitution’s meaning in the 
abstract; it does not require attention to any particular factors of 
any particular conflict. It is not meaningfully different from the 
question, for example, whether the president has authority to 
seize steel mills to avert a strike, or whether the president has 
authority to terminate treaties without Senate approval. True, it 
might lead to a decision that a particular executive-initiated 
conflict is unauthorized—quite possibly running afoul of the Baker 
factors of embarrassment and multifarious pronouncements—but 
Zivotofsky appears to discount those factors, at least where a pure 
question of law is presented. True also, the constitutional 
question may be a hard one (at least for some types of conflicts), 
but Zivotofsky makes clear that even a difficult question of 
constitutional meaning is for the courts to decide.35 
As a result, a post-Zivotofsky analysis confirms the view of 
the Second and D.C. Circuits in the Vietnam era that the need 
for congressional authorization is (or at least can be) a judicial 
question. The decisions that instead found a political question on 
this point rested on the proposition that the scope of the 
president’s foreign affairs powers is broadly nonjusticiable36—a 
proposition rejected in Zivotofsky. Nor is it clear that judicial 
engagement with the question is problematic: courts managed it 
in the Vietnam era37 as well as in earlier times.38 
The second part of the authorization question is more 
problematic. Hostilities exist on a scale from minor skirmishes to 
total war. Some line must be drawn unless one thinks 
 
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663, 2665 n.12 (2015) 
(finding that Arizona legislature had standing to contest allegedly unconstitutional 
diminution of its powers, but expressly reserving the question of whether the U.S. 
Congress would have standing to challenge actions of the president). 
 35 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (acknowledging difficulty of the 
case but finding it to “demand[] careful examination of the textual, structural, and 
historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of 
the passport and recognition powers”). 
 36 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 37 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 38 See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–67 
(1863) (deciding on the merits whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South 
during the Civil War was constitutional); see also infra Part IV (discussing 
additional cases). 
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(implausibly) that either all military actions must be authorized 
by Congress or none must be. The difficulty of drawing the line in 
some circumstances should not preclude adjudication when the 
line is clear, however, as the Second Circuit found in the 
Vietnam-era cases.39 Further, the issue can be made more 
manageable if courts approach it categorically, finding that the 
presence of certain circumstances do or do not bring a conflict 
within the need for approval. For example, in the 2011 Libya 
conflict, the President argued that congressional approval was 
not required because U.S. military actions consisted wholly of 
airstrikes, were of limited duration, and did not involve major 
threats to U.S. personnel.40 With these descriptions being largely 
uncontested as a factual matter, a court could decide as a matter 
of constitutional interpretation whether a conflict so described 
requires congressional authorization. 
On the other hand, some situations may resist categorical 
assessment because they depend on disputed or uncertain facts 
or subjective characterizations. For example, the U.S. military 
action in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State seems 
challenging to describe categorically: the nature of the Islamic 
State, the extent of the U.S. role, and the U.S. objectives seem 
sufficiently unsettled that judicial assessment would be, at 
minimum, a qualitatively different task than the one envisioned 
in Zivotofsky.41 
C. Questions Involving the Type of Congressional Approval 
A second major issue in the Vietnam era was whether 
Congress could authorize hostilities either by appropriations or 
by the vaguely worded Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Courts divided 
on whether that question was justiciable.42 Zivotofsky suggests 
that it should be. A court’s analysis here would not seem to 
depend on factual assessments or subjective characterizations. 
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that appropriations do not 
 
 39 E.g., DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (concluding that the Vietnam conflict was a war 
for constitutional purposes). 
 40 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6–14 (2011); see also 
Michael D. Ramsey, Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency, 110 AMER. 
J. INT’L L. 701, 701–07, 711–13 (2016) (discussing the constitutional debate over the Libya 
action). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention, 
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 980–98 (2016) (defending the constitutionality of the U.S. military 
action), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Military Force and Violence but Neither War 
nor Hostilities, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 998–1005 (2016) (finding the Libya action 
unconstitutional). 
 41 See infra Part VI (discussing post-Zivotofsky litigation challenging U.S. military 
action against the Islamic State). 
 42 See supra Part II. 
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count as approval for constitutional purposes.43 Whether this is 
correct or not is a question of constitutional interpretation 
separate from the facts, policies, and descriptions of any 
particular conflict; the analysis would be analogous to the way 
the Court described Zivotofsky as requiring “careful examination 
of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by 
the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the 
passport and recognition powers.”44 
One might conclude—as the Second Circuit did—that the 
Constitution delegates to Congress the decision how to authorize 
military conflict. Perhaps that makes it a political question 
(textually committed to another branch), as the Second Circuit 
described it.45 But Zivotofsky indicates that it is better 
understood as a decision on the merits: if the Constitution does 
not require any particular method of authorization, plaintiffs’ 
challenge to Congress’s method of authorization fails on the 
merits. Similarly, one might say in Zivotofsky that the 
president’s recognition power is exclusive and gives the president 
power to decide how to describe the status of Jerusalem. But as 
the decision in Zivotofsky (and the subsequent litigation)46 
indicates, that is a question on the merits—whether the 
Constitution (as interpreted by the judiciary) gives the president 
that exclusive authority. 
In sum, courts should be able to decide, post-Zivotofsky, 
whether the Constitution requires Congress’s authorization to be 
given in particular ways. 
D. Questions Involving the Scope of Congressional Approval 
The most difficult of the Vietnam-era cases appear to be 
challenges to the scope of congressional approval. These are 
almost necessarily fact-intensive—both what Congress approved 
and what is going on in a particular conflict. For example, if one 
concluded that after repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 
Congress had approved only actions designed to wind down the 
war, it is (as the Second Circuit found) hard to say what 
activities are designed to wind down the war.47 The decision of 
 
 43 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In doing so, the court 
famously relied on “what every schoolboy knows”: that once hostilities begin, Congress 
will feel an obligation to fund them. Id. 
 44 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200 (2012). 
 45 See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 46 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 204–05, 219–20 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (on 
remand, finding Section 214(d) unconstitutional as infringing the president’s recognition 
power), aff’d, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015). 
 47 See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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how to wind down the war seems within the category of 
presidential discretion Chief Justice Marshall identified in 
Marbury v. Madison, in the earliest formulation of the political 
question doctrine.48 And it calls for a political solution: if 
Congress wanted to narrow presidential discretion, it could write 
a narrower statute. 
The modern example of the conflict against the Islamic State 
is also illustrative. Arguably, Congress authorized U.S. military 
action against the Islamic State, either through the 2001 
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the 
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, or the 2003 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force in Iraq. But reaching either conclusion 
requires inquiry into difficult facts: to what extent the Islamic 
State was connected to al Qaeda, or to what extent the Islamic 
State was connected to prior Iraqi insurgent groups against 
whom military action was clearly authorized.49 Adjudication of 
these questions seems problematic and beyond Zivotofsky’s 
direction. The inquiry would involve not merely the ordinary 
tools of constitutional interpretation, but also resolution 
of factual disputes and characterizations that may be less 
judicially manageable. 
Of course, often there will be no arguable congressional 
authorization of a military conflict—as with the U.S. action in 
Libya in 2011.50 And sometimes no plausible argument will 
stretch an authorization to cover a remote conflict. Judge Oakes’ 
opinion in the Cambodian bombing case51 may be an example of 
this: as the bombing was secret (and indeed the war had been 
fought on the premise that Cambodia was neutral), Congress’s 
appropriations for winding down the war it knew about seem 
inadequate to approve the Cambodian bombing, without 
requiring any inquiry into disputed facts or characterizations.52 
Nonetheless, it seems likely that some disputes over the 
scope of congressional authorization will depend on how one 
characterizes the nature and purpose of the hostilities. 
Adjudication thus runs substantial risk of infringing the 
 
 48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see also infra Part 
IV (discussing Marbury). 
 49 See generally Prakash, supra note 40 (considering these issues); see also infra Part 
VI (discussing litigation related to military action against the Islamic State). 
 50 See Prakash, supra note 40, at 999. 
 51 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge 
Oakes, dissenting). 
 52 See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The 
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1137–38, 
1147–48 (1990). 
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president’s war-fighting discretion or of involving the judiciary in 
the finding or characterization of facts for which it is manifestly 
unsuited. Both of these lines of the political question doctrine 
remain viable after Zivotofsky and should foreclose some aspects 
of war powers adjudication. 
E. Implications 
In sum, real and hypothetical war powers litigation indicate 
that the issues sometimes are largely questions of constitutional 
or statutory meaning and sometimes turn on disputed facts 
or subjective characterizations. A Zivotofsky-inspired approach 
suggests that the former are not political questions while the 
latter may be. Interpretation of statutes and the Constitution as 
a general matter is, Zivotofsky said, entrusted to the courts,53 and 
courts do not lack standards to decide such cases even where 
finding the right answer may be difficult or pose potential 
embarrassment to the president. The second category of cases, 
however, raises difficulties on both prongs of the political 
question doctrine that Zivotofsky left intact. Where there are 
conflicting views as to how to fight a war or how to characterize 
an enemy or a U.S. objective, the Constitution commits the 
discretion to the president, and the president should not be 
second-guessed by the courts (per Marbury).54 Situations where 
the facts are disputed, rapidly evolving, and difficult to 
characterize, suggest a lack of judicially manageable standards 
(or, to put it another way, a practical need to defer to the 
president’s assessment of the hostile situation). 
IV. ZIVOTOFSKY AND THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS 
This section considers whether an expanded role for courts in 
war powers adjudication is consistent with the Constitution’s 
original meaning and the Constitution’s implementation in 
the early post-ratification era. It finds that Zivotofsky’s 
distinction between interpreting legal texts, on one hand, and 
second-guessing the exercise of executive discretion, on the other, 
has strong roots in post-ratification practice and is supported by 
the Constitution’s text. 
To begin with the text, the Constitution does not suggest any 
difference in the courts’ role in war powers adjudication (and 
other foreign affairs-related adjudication) as compared to 
 
 53 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200–02 (2012). 
 54 See generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 
941 (2004). 
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ordinary constitutional litigation.55 The judiciary’s powers and 
duties with respect to adjudication are conveyed in general 
terms, without reservation as to war or foreign affairs powers.56 
The grants of war and military powers to other branches of 
government are intermingled within the Constitution’s text with 
other grants of—and limits on—governmental powers without 
singling them out for special nonjusticiability. In contrast, some 
particular subjects may seem to be textually reserved to other 
branches. For example, “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members;”57 
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member”;58 and “[t]he Senate 
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”59 But there is 
no similar language relating to war powers controversies. 
Further, leading contemporaneous assessments of the text do not 
indicate any war-related exception to the courts’ decisional 
authority. Most notably, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, setting out 
the theory of judicial review later substantially adopted by 
Marbury v. Madison, does not refer to non-justiciability of war 
powers controversies.60 
Modern assessments of the political question doctrine 
typically associate its origins with Chief Justice Marshall’s 
opinion in Marbury.61 An examination of Marbury and its 
subsequent applications indicate that Zivotofsky is consistent 
with early practice. Marbury’s discussion of the issue was 
as follows: 
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested 
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is 
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his 
political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the 
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain 
officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders. 
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be 
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, 
 
 55 See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
321–41 (2007). 
 56 See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 57 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 58 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 59 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 60 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 330–31. 
 61 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
239 (2002). 
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still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. 
The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual 
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the 
executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be 
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the 
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were 
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the 
President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. 
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by 
the courts. 
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other 
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when 
the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those 
acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his 
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights 
of others. 
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of 
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, 
merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in 
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, 
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only 
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, 
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it 
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, 
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.62 
Marshall then gave as an example: “The power of nominating to 
the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, 
are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to 
his own discretion.”63 In contrast, he said, once the appointment 
is made, the president lacks discretion to revoke it (in the case of 
an officer not removable at will by the president).64 
One might conclude from this discussion that Marshall’s idea 
of political questions was tautological: that is, where the 
president had discretion unbounded by law, courts—whose power 
is to “say what the law is”65—had no role. (This would be the 
case, for example, in the nomination/appointment illustration 
Marshall invoked.) But Marshall might also have had in mind 
situations in which the president exercised discretion bounded by 
law; for example, where the president made factual assessments 
or military judgments in support of the president’s constitutional 
powers. In any event, Marbury’s concept of political questions 
 
 62 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803). 
 63 Id. at 167. 
 64 Id. at 162. 
 65 Id. at 177. 
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arising from executive discretion would not displace the judicial 
role in interpreting legal texts, even where those texts relate to 
the extent of executive discretion. As Zivotofsky explained, there 
is a difference between asking whom the Constitution empowers 
to make a decision and asking whether the correct decision 
was made. 
This distinction runs implicitly through post-Marbury cases 
in the war and foreign affairs areas. Little v. Barreme, decided 
the next year, challenged the legality of the president’s order to 
seize ships sailing to or from French possessions during the naval 
hostilities with France.66 A statute authorized seizure of ships 
sailing “to”—but not “from”—French possessions; the Court read 
the statute literally and exclusively, finding the challenged 
seizure to be unlawful.67 The Court did not consider whether the 
case presented a political question. Similarly, in Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Court considered whether 
the U.S. Navy’s seizure of a ship was authorized by the 
Non-Intercourse Act; the Court found it was not authorized 
because the ship was not American-owned (in doing so, giving 
rise to the “Charming Betsy canon” that statutes should, if 
possible, be construed not to violate international law).68 As in 
Little, the Court did not consider whether the issue was a 
political question. Finally, in Brown v. United States, the Court 
again found a seizure unconstitutional—in that case, the 
executive branch’s seizure of British-owned timber during the 
War of 1812.69 Writing for the Court, Marshall found the seizure 
unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Congress’s 
declaration of war and therefore it was beyond the president’s 
constitutional powers.70 Thus, all three cases found executive 
branch action in wartime to be illegal without expressing any 
reservations about justiciability. That view is consistent with 
Marbury because in each case, the question was not whether the 
president or the executive branch had properly exercised 
discretion, but whether the president or the executive branch had 
 
 66 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804). 
 67 Id. at 178–79. 
 68 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18 (1804). 
 69 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 150–52 (1814). 
 70 See id. at 122–25; see also David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge, 
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 40–41 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey 
& William S. Dodge eds., 2011). Specifically, Brown was an application of the Charming 
Betsy canon: the Court found that international law generally allowed enemy aliens a 
period after a declaration of war to withdraw their property to avoid confiscation, and 
that the 1812 declaration of war, because it lacked language to the contrary, should be 
read not to violate this practice. Id. 
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been granted discretionary power by the Constitution or 
applicable statutes. 
In contrast, the Court did appear to invoke a form of the 
political question doctrine in its early cases to avoid reviewing 
executive branch factual determinations or other discretionary 
determinations, or to avoid making such determinations for 
itself. In United States v. Palmer, for example, the Court refused 
to assess the legitimacy of a rebellious government in the 
Spanish colonies.71 Marshall wrote for the Court: 
Those questions which respect the rights of a part of a foreign empire, 
which asserts, and is contending for its independence, and the conduct 
which must be observed by the courts of the union towards the 
subjects of such section of an empire who may be brought before the 
tribunals of this country, are equally delicate and difficult. 
As it is understood that the construction which has been given to the 
act of congress, will render a particular answer to them unnecessary, 
the court will only observe, that such questions are generally rather 
political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to 
those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation 
in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own 
judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign 
relations; than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is 
confined to the application of the rule which the legislature may 
prescribe for it. In such contests a nation may engage itself with the 
one party or the other—may observe absolute neutrality—may 
recognize the new state absolutely—or may make a limited 
recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so entirely on 
the course of the government, that it is difficult to give a precise 
answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation. It may 
be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and 
recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as 
criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the 
new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise, 
would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties 
was unlawful, and would be to arrange the nation to which the court 
belongs against that party. This would transcend the limits prescribed 
to the judicial department.72 
Similarly, in Rose v. Himely, Marshall wrote for the 
Court: “It is for governments to decide whether they will consider 
St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision 
shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of 
justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining 
 
 71 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818). 
 72 Id. 
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unaltered . . . .”73 Notably, none of these cases involved a question 
of executive or congressional authority under the Constitution or 
a statute, and thus they did not involve pure questions of 
interpretation of legal texts as emphasized in Zivotofsky.74 
The historical litigation most similar to potential modern 
war powers litigation is The Prize Cases, decided in 1863. The 
issue was whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the 
South during the Civil War was unconstitutional as beyond 
presidential power.75 Despite the wartime setting, the Court 
decided the case on the merits. As a co-author and I previously 
described it: 
The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize Cases is that the 
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s military 
actions during wartime and very nearly ruled against the President. 
And this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s 
counsel for judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion 
that deciding the merits would make the Court “an ally of 
the enemy”). . . . 
But although the Court made a show of deciding the cases on their 
merits, the majority opinion contained language of substantial 
deference to the executive. The Court was quite willing to accept the 
President’s characterization of the situation as war (even though, at 
the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots had been fired only at a 
single fort, and no one had been killed by hostile fire). Indeed, 
[Justice] Grier [in the majority opinion] asserted that the President’s 
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court . . . . 
 
 73 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808). For later cases, see Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“In a controversy between two nations 
concerning national boundary . . . the Court [must] conform its decisions to the will of the 
legislature . . . .”); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419–20 (1839) 
(finding that the executive determination that Falkland Islands were not part of the 
territory of Buenos Aires was conclusive on the judiciary); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. 
(14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (finding that executive determination regarding status of Texas 
after the Texas revolution was conclusive on judiciary); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 
635, 635 (1854) (holding that whether the King of Spain had authority to annul land 
grants made to Spanish citizens was not a judicial question); and Jones v. United States, 
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a 
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and 
executive departments . . . conclusively binds the judges . . . .”). See also Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 
1909–15 (2015) (reviewing cases); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 592 (2007) (“[A]n important branch of [the political question] 
doctrine [in the nineteenth century] operated to identify factual questions on which courts 
would accept the political branches’ determinations as binding.”). 
 74 See Grove, supra note 73, at 1918 n.41 (concluding that “the traditional [political 
question] doctrine did not encompass constitutional questions (that is, the determination 
whether a statute or other governmental action complied with the Constitution)”).  
 75 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640–41 (1863). 
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On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference, on the 
crucial question whether the insurrection had progressed to the level 
of a full-blown civil war the Court also referred to contemporaneous 
recognition of a state of war by foreign nations, the comparatively 
amorphous and evolving nature of civil war, the disruption of the 
courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its conclusion before 
making the point about deference. Indeed, one could easily argue that 
the executive deference point . . . was a throwaway claim of little 
consequence placed late in the opinion.76 
Thus, while the decision can be read to support varying 
levels of deference to executive factual determinations, it strongly 
supports the basic justiciability of war powers claims. To be sure, 
the decision came long after the immediate post-ratification 
period, and so may not be strongly indicative of the original view 
of the courts’ role in such controversies. But it indicates that, at 
least in the nineteenth century, constitutional war powers 
questions were not regarded as categorically beyond the reach 
of courts. 
V. POLICY 
The foregoing discussion suggests that Zivotofsky can be 
applied to war powers litigation to produce a manageable but not 
excessive role for courts. This section briefly considers whether it 
should be as a matter of contemporary policy. 
To begin, I assume courts—if they reach the merits—might 
plausibly find significant instances where congressional approval 
of hostilities is constitutionally required. The most obvious 
concern is that this conclusion would interfere with national 
security by preventing necessary U.S. military action. This 
concern might arise from at least three circumstances: (1) courts 
might require the president to desist from needed action; (2) the 
president might not take action after concluding that Congress 
would not approve or when Congress in fact refuses to approve; 
and (3) the president might not take action because it appears 
Congress would not be able to approve in time to make the 
action meaningful.  
As to the first category, the president’s most evident recourse 
in the event of an adverse judicial decision is not to stop 
hostilities, but to gain Congress’s approval. If the military action 
is truly necessary, Congress can be expected to approve. If 
 
 76 Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive 
Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 86–87 
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
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Congress does not approve, that at least raises the possibility 
that the action is not necessary (so the president’s inability to 
pursue it would not be a material downside to adjudication). 
Whether Congress is, in the general case, likely to mis-assess the 
need for military action seems speculative. The second category 
involves similar analysis. The president’s inability to act due to 
Congress’s actual or anticipated failure to approve is problematic 
only if one thinks Congress is systematically likely to disapprove 
military actions the president favors and are needed.77 It is not 
clear that is the case. As to the third category, Congress has 
shown—for example, in approving the post-9/11 Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)78—that it can act relatively 
quickly. In any event, in the face of a time-sensitive emergency, 
the president has the option of acting quickly and seeking 
retroactive approval—a course followed by presidents in 
various circumstances.79 
A related concern is that if courts find an ongoing war 
unconstitutional, it may be difficult and dangerous for the United 
States to disengage. Of course, Congress can solve the problem by 
authorizing the war, but suppose Congress does not approve of 
the war. Arguments for finding a political question in the 
Vietnam-era cases in part reflect this concern: even if Congress 
did not approve the war, the war could not be easily discontinued 
at judicial direction. 
This concern, while substantial, may be overstated. First, 
many conflicts may be relatively easy to discontinue.80 Second, 
even without a broad political question doctrine, courts will have 
various methods of restraint. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the 
Vietnam-era litigation found the war’s initiation to have been 
unconstitutional due to lack of congressional authorization, but 
refused to order any remedy.81 Third, and perhaps most 
importantly, if courts begin more active adjudication of war 
 
 77 For example, in 2013 President Obama considered military action against Syria in 
response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against rebel forces. 
However, the U.S. Congress appeared unlikely to approve, and the President decided not 
to proceed without Congress’s approval. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 714–15 (discussing 
this episode). It is not clear whether this is an example of Congress impeding a needed 
military action or constraining an unwise one. 
 78 The 2001 AUMF was approved on September 18, 2001, seven days after the 9/11 
attack. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. Law No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001). 
 79 For example, by President Lincoln at the start of the Civil War. See Lee & 
Ramsey, supra note 76, at 53. 
 80 One could easily imagine prompt U.S. disengagement from a conflict such as the 
2011 Libya intervention. 
 81 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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powers disputes, presidents would be less likely to undertake 
substantial commitments without Congress’s approval. 
Relatedly, courts can use situations in which they uphold 
presidential action to establish a framework for when Congress’s 
approval is required. For example, in The Prize Cases, decided 
during the Civil War, the Court upheld the challenged 
presidential action (imposing a blockade on the South); the 
majority emphasized that the blockade was a defensive response 
to hostilities begun by the other side, while noting that the 
president could not begin offensive hostilities without Congress’s 
approval.82 Similarly, the Second Circuit in the Vietnam-era 
cases found that Congress’s approval was required, but that 
approval had been given.83 
A further potential problem with enhanced adjudication is 
that courts, nervous about the downsides discussed above, might 
give the president more authority than the Constitution allows, 
and thus license greater presidential adventurism by giving it 
formal judicial approval. This concern cannot be entirely 
discounted, but seems speculative in light of the remedy of 
subsequent congressional authorization (that is, in most cases, 
courts would be able to ascribe any bad consequences to 
Congress’s failure to authorize the military action). 
On the other hand, some material advantages seem to arise 
from more aggressive war powers adjudication. First, as 
discussed above,84 a Zivotofsky-inspired approach seems most 
consistent with the judiciary’s original constitutional role. 
Marbury—echoing Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78—called for the 
judiciary to say what the law is, without exception for 
cases affecting foreign affairs or cases that might involve 
embarrassment or multifarious pronouncements.85 The 
expansive Baker factors were a modern invention. In the early 
post-ratification period86 (and throughout the nineteenth 
century87) courts adjudicated the legality of military force 
without invoking political question concerns. It is true, of course, 
that Marbury acknowledged a category of political questions 
 
 82 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–69 (1863); Lee & Ramsey, supra note 
76, at 72–78, 85. 
 83 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 84 See supra Part IV. 
 85 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 321, 329–34. 
 86 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176–79 (1804); RAMSEY, supra 
note 55, at 332–33 (listing further examples). 
 87 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668–69; see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 115, 115 (1851) (allowing a claim against military officer for seizure of property in 
Mexico in connection with war effort despite claims of military necessity). 
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outside judicial competence.88 But that category does not extend 
to matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
Second, enhanced judicial involvement would likely provide 
a greater check on the president. Currently it is largely left to 
Congress to provide a political check. However, Congress’s 
practical ability to check the president in war powers matters 
seems open to doubt. Congress may lack the incentives and 
political will to contest the president in war powers controversies 
except in extreme circumstances. Although one may debate 
whether more checks upon the president in war powers are 
desirable, they seem consistent with the Constitution’s original 
design. Multiple framers argued that the president’s excessive 
tendency to war required congressional involvement in the 
war-initiation decision.89 
Third, modern war powers authority suffers from the 
perception that it lacks a rule of law. That is, with regard to any 
presidential military action, there is debate in commentary (and 
sometimes in Congress) whether it is constitutional, often with 
multiple voices claiming the president is acting illegally.90 
However, without an authoritative decision maker to resolve 
these claims, the law remains unsettled and contested. Even if 
(as was likely true in the Vietnam conflict) the president acts 
with adequate approval, constitutional questions may cloud his 
authority. The president (and the country) likely would have 
benefitted from a clear, prompt judicial ruling that the Vietnam 
conflict was constitutional. 
Finally, the likely result of greater judicial involvement 
would be greater cooperation between the president and 
Congress in war powers matters. In many modern conflicts in 
which congressional approval was not sought, approval likely 
would have been forthcoming: the president might choose not to 
seek approval because there might seem no immediate gain from 
doing so, not because there is a major disagreement between the 
president and Congress. It seems plausible, for example, that 
Congress would have approved military strikes in Libya, and it 
 
 88 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see also United States 
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818) (referring to “questions [that] are 
generally rather political than legal in their character”); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 
112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (finding that the president had constitutional power to protect 
U.S. citizens abroad, and that whether the use of force was necessary in the particular 
circumstances was a matter of executive discretion and thus was a “public political 
question” unreviewable under Marbury). 
 89 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 235–37. 
 90 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 40. 
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seems likely Congress would approve continuing military action 
against the Islamic State. In the long term, the president would 
be in a stronger position directing a unified rather than a 
unilateral military action. 
VI. POST-ZIVOTOFSKY WAR POWERS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER 
COURTS 
This section reviews post-Zivotofsky war powers litigation in 
the lower courts, focusing on two leading cases: Jaber v. United 
States91 and Smith v. Obama.92 Although both decisions found a 
political question barrier to the particular dispute, their 
application of Zivotofsky follows the discussion above and 
confirms the justiciability of some war powers disputes. 
In Jaber, the plaintiffs’ relatives were killed by a U.S. drone 
strike in Yemen.93 The relatives were not targets of the strike but 
unfortunately were in the vicinity of al Qaeda members who were 
targeted. The plaintiffs made various claims under two U.S. 
statutes, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim 
Protection Act (“TVPA”), that the strike violated international 
law.94 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
the claim on political question grounds, with this assessment 
of Zivotofsky: 
Zivotofsky confirms no per se rule renders a claim nonjusticiable solely 
because it implicates foreign relations. Rather, it recognizes that, in 
foreign policy cases, courts must first ascertain if “[t]he federal courts 
are . . . being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision of the 
political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination” or, 
instead, merely tasked with, for instance, the “familiar judicial 
exercise” of determining how a statute should be interpreted or 
whether it is constitutional. In the latter case, the claim is justiciable. 
Therefore, if the court is called upon to serve as “a forum for 
reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the 
political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security[,]” 
then the political question doctrine is implicated, and the court 
cannot proceed.  
Zivotofsky sought only to enforce a statute alleged to directly regulate 
the Executive, and the reviewing court needed to determine only “if 
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute [was] correct, and whether 
the statute [was] constitutional.” The Court was not called upon 
 
 91 861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 92 217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 93 Jaber, 861 F.3d at 243. 
 94 Id. The plaintiffs did not claim that the strike was unconstitutional, presumably 
because they thought the 2001 AUMF had authorized hostilities against al Qaeda 
personnel in Yemen. 
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to impose its own foreign policy judgment on the political branches, 
only to say whether the congressional statute encroached on the 
Executive’s constitutional authority. This is the wheelhouse of the 
Judiciary, and accordingly, it does not constitute a nonjusticiable 
political question. Here, however, Plaintiffs assert claims under the 
TVPA and the ATS that would require the Court to second-guess the 
wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ lethal force against a 
national security target—to determine, among other things, whether 
“an urgent military purpose or other emergency justified” a particular 
drone strike. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ request is more analogous to an action 
challenging the Secretary of State’s independent refusal to recognize 
Israel as the rightful sovereign of the city of Jerusalem, a decision 
clearly committed to executive discretion.95 
This assessment seems correct and consistent with some 
justiciability of war powers claims. The key is the court’s 
characterization of the claims as “requir[ing] the Court to 
second-guess the wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ 
lethal force against a national security target—to determine, 
among other things, whether an ‘urgent military purpose or 
other emergency justified’ a particular drone strike.”96 This 
situation-specific analysis, which does seem to render 
justiciability problematic even under a broad view of Zivotofsky, 
would not be present in the more typical constitutional dispute 
over presidential war initiation. Where the question is simply 
whether the president has independent constitutional authority 
to act in response to a set of undisputed events, the situation is 
analogous to the one described by the court as justiciable: where 
the court is “tasked with, for instance, the ‘familiar judicial 
exercise’ of determining how a statute should be interpreted or 
whether it is constitutional.”97 In the war powers situation, 
typically the court would be assessing whether an executive 
action (rather than a statute) is unconstitutional, but that should 
not be a material distinction in many cases. As in Zivotofsky (and 
in contrast to Jaber), the question for the court would be which 
branch has decision-making authority under the Constitution, 
not what decision should be made. 
Smith v. Obama involved a service member’s constitutional 
challenge to the president’s use of force against the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria.98 The central claim was that neither the 2001 
AUMF nor the 2002 authorization of the action against Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq provided congressional authorization for military 
 
 95 Id. at 248–49 (citations omitted). 
 96 Id. at 249 (citation omitted). 
 97 Id. at 248 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
 98 See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 284 (D.D.C. 2016). 
Do Not Delete 3/3/18 7:16 PM 
200 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
action against the Islamic State.99 The district court dismissed 
the claim on political question grounds after a careful assessment 
of Zivotofsky.100 Acknowledging that not all questions relating to 
war are nonjusticiable, the court stated: 
[T]he Court begins by clarifying the precise questions posed by 
Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the notion that 
Congress has not previously authorized the use of force against [the 
Islamic State]. Defendant disputes this. Resolving this dispute would 
require the Court to determine whether the legal authorizations for 
the use of military force relied on by President Obama—the 2001 and 
2002 AUMFs—in fact authorize the use of force against [the Islamic 
State]. With regard to the 2001 AUMF, the Court would have to 
determine whether the President is correct that [the Islamic State] is 
among “those nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,” and 
that Operation Inherent Resolve represents “necessary and 
appropriate force” against that group. With regard to the 2002 AUMF, 
the Court would have to determine whether the President is correct 
that operations against [the Islamic State] are “necessary and 
appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United 
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” For the reasons 
set out below, the Court finds that these are political questions under 
the first two Baker factors: the issues raised are primarily ones 
committed to the political branches of government, and the Court 
lacks judicially manageable standards, and is otherwise ill-equipped, 
to resolve them.101 
The court then elaborated: 
Plaintiff’s attempts to analogize his case to Zivotofsky are strained. 
Although, as in Zivotofsky, statutes are involved in this case—in 
particular, the War Powers Resolution, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002 
AUMF—this case does not present nearly the same fundamental legal 
issues as were at issue in Zivotofsky. The questions posed in this case 
go significantly beyond interpreting statutes and determining whether 
 
 99 See Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-state-war-
powers-lawsuit-obama.html?mcubz=0; Bruce Ackerman, Is America’s War on ISIS 
Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/opinion/is-
americas-war-on-isis-illegal.html?mcubz=0. The statutes, rather than independent 
presidential power, were the president’s principal bases for authority to take military 
action against the Islamic State. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 710–11. 
 100 See Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297. The court also found that Smith lacked 
standing as an independent ground for dismissal. Id. at 285. The case is currently on 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where the standing issue has taken a 
central role after the plaintiff’s departure from active service in the military. See Brief for 
Appellee at 17–25, Smith v. Obama (No. 16-5377), https://www.scribd.com/document/ 
351181196/DOJ-Response-to-Nathan-Michael-Smith-Appeal [http://perma.cc/3G5S-LSDK]. 
 101 Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (citations omitted). 
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they are constitutional. Plaintiff asks the Court to second-guess the 
Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on the ground 
in an ongoing combat mission halfway around the world. For example, 
the Court is not asked simply to “interpret” the 2001 AUMF, or to 
determine its constitutionality. It is asked to determine whether the 
President is correct that [the Islamic State], as it exists today, is an 
appropriate target under that resolution based on the nature and 
extent of [the Islamic State]’s relationship and connections with the 
terrorist organization that the President has determined was 
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Court would also 
have to go further than simply “interpreting” the 2002 AUMF. It 
would have to determine whether the President is correct that the 
ongoing military action against [the Islamic State] is in fact 
“necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national 
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed 
by Iraq.” 
The reality, then, is more nuanced than Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff’s 
claims raise mixed questions of both discretionary military 
judgment and statutory interpretation. The Court does not read 
Zivotofsky as foreclosing the application of the political question 
doctrine under this scenario.102 
Again, the court’s emphasis is on the claim involving “mixed 
questions of both discretionary military judgment and statutory 
interpretation.”103 As discussed above, one can imagine many 
situations in which war-initiation disputes are such mixed 
questions; but one can also imagine many situations in which 
such disputes are not mixed questions and involve only questions 
of constitutional interpretation. Consistent with Zivotofsky, the 
Smith court’s analysis suggests that the latter disputes might 
be justiciable. 
The court then focused on the key Zivotofsky factors: textual 
commitment and judicially manageable standards: 
First, certain aspects of the questions posed by this case are 
indisputably and completely committed to the political branches of 
government. Both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorize only that force 
that the President determines is “necessary and appropriate.” The 
necessity and appropriateness of military action is precisely the type 
of discretionary military determination that is committed to the 
political branches and which the Court has no judicially manageable 
standards to adjudicate. 
Second, . . . [b]ased on the pleadings thus far alone, the Court can 
easily discern that this case raises factual questions that are not of a 
type the Court is equipped to handle with traditional judicially 
 
 102 Id. at 299–300 (citations omitted). 
 103 Id. at 300. 
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manageable standards. The President and Department of Defense 
officials apparently believe that [the Islamic State] is connected with 
al Qaeda and that, despite public rifts, some allegiances between the 
groups persist and [the Islamic State] continues to pursue the same 
mission today as it did before allegedly splintering from al Qaeda. 
Plaintiff disputes these factual assertions, relying on an affidavit from 
scholars of Islamic Law that argue that as of today, the groups are in 
fact sufficiently distinct, and potentially even antagonistic, that they 
can no longer be viewed as the same terrorist organization. Resolving 
this dispute would require inquiries into sensitive military 
determinations, presumably made based on intelligence collected on 
the ground in a live theatre of combat, and potentially changing and 
developing on an ongoing basis. See Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 
F.Supp.2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The difficulty that U.S. courts would 
encounter if they were tasked with ‘ascertaining the ‘facts’ of military 
decisions exercised thousands of miles from the forum, lies at the 
heart of the determination whether the question [posed] is a 
‘political’ one.’”) (quoting DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1148 
(2d Cir. 1973)).104 
Thus, if a war powers claim did not involve such factual 
determinations (and some plausibly might not), this reasoning 
suggests that the claim would be justiciable.105 As a result, the 
 
 104 Id. at 300–01 (some citations omitted). 
 105 The court added a further consideration that might pose a broader barrier to 
war powers litigation, but that also seems unsupported by either Zivotofsky or 
the Constitution: 
Finally, an additional factor makes judicial intervention particularly 
inappropriate on the specific facts of this case. Unlike the situation presented 
in Zivotofsky, the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between 
the two political branches regarding the challenged action. In fact, Congress 
has repeatedly provided funding for the effort against [the Islamic State]. For 
example, on November 10, 2014, President Obama sent a letter to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives requesting that Congress consider proposed 
amendments to the 2015 Budget to provide funding for Operation Inherent 
Resolve. The letter explained that “[t]hese amendments would provide $5.6 
billion for OCO activities to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—including military operations as part of Operation 
Inherent Resolve.” President Obama also attached a letter from the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, which explained in some detail the 
military operations that the additional budget would be used to fund. In 
December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Acts of 2015, in which it appropriated the funds the President 
had sought. . . . 
The Congressional budget activity cited above by Defendant, and relied on by 
the Court, demonstrates that the Court can discern no impasse or conflict 
between the political branches on the question of whether [the Islamic State] is 
an appropriate target under the AUMFs cited by the President as authority for 
Operation Inherent Resolve. 
This lack of conflict is relevant to the justiciability of Plaintiff's claims under 
the political question doctrine because judicial intervention into military 
affairs is particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom 
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leading post-Zivotofsky war powers cases indicate that not all 
war powers questions are political questions even though some of 
them are. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, a post-Zivotofsky analysis in separation of powers 
cases implies a distinction between, on the one hand, cases that 
involve legal interpretation, resting on traditional textual and 
historical materials, and on the other hand, cases that involve 
disputed facts, policies or characterizations. Applied to war 
powers litigation, this distinction seems both manageable and 
useful; it suggests that some war powers disputes are justiciable 
while others are not. More generally, the viability of Zivotofsky-
inspired analysis in the especially difficult area of war powers 
suggests its broad potential for lasting influence in separation of 
powers and foreign affairs disputes. 
 
 
war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military action 
at issue. 
Id. at 301–02 (footnotes and citations omitted). For this conclusion, the court cited only 
pre-Zivotofsky cases and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky. Id. at 302–03. 
Although it is true that Zivotofsky involved a conflict between Congress and the president, 
the majority opinion did not suggest that such a conflict was essential to its finding of 
justiciability (and no other Justice joined Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it should 
be). Further, as the Court has emphasized elsewhere, the structural provisions of the 
Constitution exist not merely to protect the powers of particular branches of government, 
but principally to protect individual liberty by assuring checked and divided powers 
among all the branches. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011). 
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